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Abstract
The effects of likely regulatory and policy changes in the US gasoline and additives
market are compared to a reference baseline. The baseline reflects existing EPA policies
about fuel quality regulation and likely petroleum and gasoline expansions. The market
and welfare effects are presented for implementing a renewable fuel standard; imposing a
national ban on the additive MTBE; and removing the oxygen standard for reformulated fuel.
Market and welfare estimates are based on adjusting product market demands and factor
supplies. Product market and price analyses include quality-differentiated products, such
as refinery gasoline, chemical additives and ethanol at the wholesale level; and gasoline
grades in conventional, reformulated and oxygenated markets at the ratail level. Factor
market analyses include supplies for petroleum, natural gas byproducts, and corn. The
analysis includes the welfare cost of fuel to consumers and income in agriculture and the
petroleum sector.
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1. Introduction
The presence of biofuels in the US gasoline and additive market was
shaped by environmental regulation and national security concerns. Previous US
Clean Air Acts have created new demands for additives with specific attributes.
Moreover, ethanol’s exemption to part of the excise tax on gasoline, defended
on the grounds of national security and infant industry protection, boosts bio-
fuel supply. Ethanol’s presence consists of 7% share of the additives market,
which is produced with the processing industry using 5% of the US corn
supply.
Some new policies may push biofuels beyond a token presence in the
fuel and additives markets. First, serious consideration is being given to a re-
newable fuels standard for US gasoline amidst concerns about global
warming and national security. Second, ongoing health concerns and impend-
ing bans on a competing additive may restrict other fuel supplies. Analysis of
product prices, factor availability and welfare in the gasoline/additives sector
may point to the appropriate scale for biofuels in contemporary fuel and farm
markets.
We compare the effects of some likely regulatory and policy changes in
the gasoline/additives market to a reference baseline situation in this paper. The
baseline reflects existing EPA policies about fuel quality regulation and likely
petroleum and gasoline expansions during the next decade. Next, we analyze
the effects of replacing the current oxygen standard with a renewable averag-
ing policy on the role of biofuels in the gasoline/additives market. Indeed, the
current US energy bill includes a “renewable fuel standard” (RFS)
(Congressional Record, 2002); a national ban on the additive MTBE is also in-
cluded in the simulations, to conform with the evolution of health regulations
and the current energy bill. Finally, a national MTBE ban without the renew-
able fuel standard is presented to disentangle the effects of a joint policy
change.
The article is organized as follows. First, a review of the gasoline and
additives market is given. Next a simulation model suitable for analysis of regu-
lation changes is presented. Then policy alternatives are compared; simulations
suggest growth for gasoline/additives demand and the ethanol industry under
a future baseline situation. Also, the renewables policy produces a significant
increase in ethanol demand over the baseline level. However, the MTBE ban
in isolation still could cause a moderate addition to ethanol demand above the
baseline. Either policy change from the baseline would detract from measured wel-
fare accruing to factor suppliers, processors, and consumers in the fuel-additives
sector. But measured welfare losses in markets may be offset by unmeasured
environmental and health benefits. Further, farmers will likely get a boost to
farm income in the current environment, under all of the plausible situations
considered.
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2. Production processes, products, and quality in the gasoline/additives
market
The absence of refinery capacity expansion during the last two decades in spite
of a growing market is a striking feature of the US fuel sector. Partly, the lack of
growth can be traced to increasingly rigid environmental regulation of the refin-
ery process. Additionally, growing demands for clean fuels have shifted capacity
expansions towards additives that fill quality gaps in the refinery gasoline supply.
An understanding of additive and biofuel demands requires an understanding of
refinery products and attributes that are in deficit. So a review of intermediate
products and processes for refineries and additives is helpful.
2.1. Processes and products
The gasoline fuel processing complex summarized in Fig. 1 relies on three
natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, and biomass.1 In turn, the production
process and environmental characteristics of gasoline/additive components de-
pends on physical characteristics of the resource. For instance, petroleum contains
several long and complicated hydrocarbons with a high proportion of carbon; pro-
cessing is devoted to separating, breaking down, or reshaping into chemicals that
are useful for fuel and plastic. Environmental disadvantages of high carbon con-
tent are poor air quality with incomplete combustion and global warming when
combustion is complete. In contrast, most additives are based on natural gas, or
byproducts from natural gas and refinery production. These inputs have simple
physical structure with a low proportion of carbon. So complete combustion oc-
curs with lower carbon dioxide emissions. Ethanol also burns clean with a low
carbon dioxide content. Further, ethanol production offsets global warming, be-
cause photosynthesis reverses the oxygen gas to carbon dioxide processes involved
in combustion (Wang, Saricks, & Santini, 1999); a partial offset occurs today, due
to the energy used in corn drying and partial blends. But complete carbon dioxide
offsets are plausible in the future with biomass processing and blends with high
ethanol concentration.
The petroleum refinery is a collection of fixed proportion production processes
that separate large petroleum molecules into several smaller molecules. In the pri-
mary distillation phase, lighter products (napthas and kerosine) evaporate at low
temperatures, heavier products (gas-oils) at higher temperatures and the heavi-
est products (vacuum bottoms) remain liquid even at the highest temperatures in
approximately fixed proportions.
1 The process yield and cost estimates are discussed in this section (Cole & Trotta, 2000;
Donaldson & Culberson, 1983; Gary & Handwerk, 1994; Hohmann & Rendleman, 1993; John &
Thomas, 1993; Ragsdale, 1994; Shapouri, Gallagher, & Graboski, 2001). Details are available from
the author upon request.
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Fig. 1. The gasoline/additive processing complex. (A) Refinery; (B) chemical additives; (C) biomass
additives.
Secondary processes use distillation outputs as inputs. First, light napthas are
sent to conventional reformers that yield gasoline with high benzene content, which
enhances the average octane of gasoline. Further, a new reforming process splits
the naptha, removing benzene and satisfying clean air laws. Second, kerosine can
be sold or blended with gasoline for jet fuel. Third, the allocation of intermediate
weight gas-oils to the hydrocracker or catalytic cracker determines whether diesel
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fuel or gasoline is emphasized. Fourth, the heaviest distillation output, vacuum
bottoms, are sold as residual fuel oil or allocated to the coker. All of the secondary
refinery processes yield some gasoline, as shown on the RHS of Fig. 1A.
In the secondary processing steps, refiners do have some flexibility in choosing
the product composition and quality of outputs. At the sector level, however, the
annual variation in the proportional allocation to secondary processing steps is
small. As a first approximation then, the refinery is treated as a composite fixed
proportions production process with secondary processing allocations defined by
the high gasoline output typical in the United States.
Most gasoline additives combine byproduct chemicals from natural gas or
petroleum processing into another chemical with more desirable fuel attributes.
Most input chemicals are also produced from natural gas or LP gas directly. The
main additives are alkylates, polymers, and MTBE (Fig. 1B). Iso-octane, an alky-
late, may replace MTBE under some circumstances.
Bio-processing separates corn into component chemicals. The starch part of
corn is used to make ethanol while other components are mostly sold as animal
feeds or human food. There are two corn processing technologies. Wet-mills sep-
arate the byproducts into three components: corn gluten feed (20% protein), corn
gluten meal (60% protein), and corn oil, as shown in Fig. 1. Dry-mills sell one com-
posite byproduct feed, distillers’ dried grains, that includes all three components.
The gasoline or additive from each process has a distinct set of performance
and environmental attributes, which are given in Table 1. Regarding availability,
note that refinery gasolines provide 83% of the fuel supply, with output from the
catalytic cracker dominant at 44%. Also, additives combined for 17% of supply,
with ethanol providing 7%.
2.2. Quality and clean air standards
Two of the attributes of Table 1, octane and vapor pressure, relate to automobile
performance. The remaining attributes relate to the EPA’s National Clean Air
Regulations. Together, performance grades and Federal Clean Air Standards define
36 grades of gasoline (see Table 5), as explained below.
Conventional gasoline, which covers about 3/4 of total gasoline consumption
in the United States, is subject to two performance constraints. First, minimum
octane content defines the fuel grade with 87 for regular, 89 for midgrade, and 91
for premium. Second, a vapor maximum of 9.5 for winter and 11 for summer fuel
must also be satisfied.
Reformulated gasoline is required in the large urban areas on both Coasts and
Texas, accounting for about 1/5 of gasoline fuel. These areas have smog problems,
in the EPA’s view. Then a car’s emission rate of target pollutants, volatile organic
compounds (VOC), nitrous oxides (NOX), toxic chemicals (TOX), and sulfur
oxides (SOX), must be reduced about 20% below recent baselines according to re-
gressions that relate emissions to fuel quality dimensions (Federal Register, 1995;
Rhodes, 1998; UOP, 1994). The statistically important fuel quality dimensions are
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Table 1
Refinery gasoline and additives: quantity and attributes
Quantity
(bil. bbl)
Attribute content
Octane
(index)
Vapor
(psi)
Benzene
(percent)
Oxygen
(percent)
Olefins
(percent)
Aromatics
(percent)
e200
(percent)
e300
(percent)
Refinery gasoline, by process
Distillation 0.24 82.5 11.2 1.4 0 0 10 94.3 100
Hydrocracker 0.041 82.6 12.9 3 0 0 3 0 7
Catalytic cracker 1.541 86.5 5.2 0.54 0 23 43 62.1 53.5
Coker 0.09 79.8 12.7 1.4 0 44 1.5 31.5 100
Reformer 0.355 91.8 2.2 4.13 0 1 1 19 70.8
Isomer 0.137 82 13.5 0 0 0 35 94.3 100
Benzene red. reformed 0.228 93.9 4.1 0 0 1 35 19 70.8
Additives
MTBE 0.0766 109 8 0 18 0 0 100 100
Alkylate 0.2237 93 4.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 36.3 95.3
Polymer 0.05 90.5 8.7 0 0 0.5 0.5 36.3 95.3
Normal butane 0.1449 91.7 59 0 0 0 0 100 100
Ethanol 0.0393 114 19 0 35 0 0 0 100
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those shown in Table 1: vapor pressure, sulfur content, oxygen, aromatics, olefins,
e200 (the fraction of the fuel that evaporates by 200F), e300, and benzene. Gen-
erally speaking, manufacturers can blend reformulated gasoline by choosing the
fuel quality dimensions to satisfy target pollutant reductions. However, a minimum
oxygen content and a maximum benzene content are still included in reformulated
gasoline.
Oxygenated fuel, which accounts for the remaining 5% of consumption, satisfies
conventional gasoline standards and adds a minimum oxygen requirement for
winter fuel. The oxygen requirement helps reduce carbon monoxide emissions.
Oxygenated fuel is required in Minneapolis, Denver, and a few mountain locations
in the southwest.
The demand growth for additives and biofuels is partly explained by escalating
performance demands of gasoline engines. The octane of regular gasoline has
increased from 60 in 1930 to 87 today (Gibbs, 1993). There would be an octane
deficit with refinery gasolines; refinery gasoline has a volume-weighted average
octane of 87 from Table 1 while the average octane demand is above 88 from the
consumption data of Table 5. All the additives in Table 1 have octane levels above
the demand level; blending fills the deficit.
The evolution of Federal Clean Air Regulation is another cause of demand
growth for additives and biofuels. First, The Clean Air Acts of 1967/1970 banned
the use of lead as a gasoline additive because it was shown that lead causes cancer
(Kitman, 2000). The lead ban created an octane deficit, and spurred expansion
in additive production. Second, the Clean Air Act of 1990 created reformulated
gasoline, including an oxygen content minimum of 2% and a benzene content
maximum of 1%. Oxygen was included on the belief that it improves combustion
while benzene was limited because it causes cancer. The oxygen minimum boosted
demand for both oxygen-containing additives: ethanol and MTBE. The benzene
maximum may boost additive demand slightly because additives do not contain
benzene.
Finally, impending policy changes may continue to expand biofuel demand.
First, the renewable fuel standard eventually requires that at least 2.4% of the
gasoline supply is ethanol. Second, national ban included in the current energy
bill reflects a conviction that MTBE (1) will increase in drinking water if used
in fuel, and (2) will increase cancer risks. Bans are pending in several major
gasoline consuming states, including California and New York (California Energy
Commission Staff, 2002). Preliminary evidence is mixed but tends to show that
MTBE causes cancer in mice (Davis, 2002).
3. A simulation model for the gasoline and additives markets
It is important that simulation analysis can account for sector wide effects and
price changes in factor and product markets. Clearly, changes of the magnitude of
the RFS could account for 10% of the corn market. Similarly, health regulations
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may exclude nearly 1/2 of the additives production while inputs for the chemical
additive industries exhausts byproduct supplies from refineries and natural gas
production. Finally, technical constraints prohibit substitution across local gasoline
markets. If a regulatory change makes an attribute required for a particular type
of fuel more valuable then, it could significantly alter the distribution of prices
across grades and fuel types. Even so, engineering studies are typically extensions
of firm-level analyses that minimize processing costs with fixed product demand
quantities and fixed factor prices.
Fortunately, programming models can be used for market-level analysis when
quality and environmental regulations are prevalent.2 This section summarizes
methodology discussed in detail by Gallagher et al. (2001). Specifically, con-
strained maximum welfare implies market outcomes when welfare is defined as
consumer surplus from gasoline product markets less costs of supplying inputs
and processing services, and the net tax extractions from the fuel sector are sub-
tracted from the sector’s welfare. Further, constraints are defined by the quality
and environmental standards of the fuel sector.
Solutions to the constrained maximization problem yield insight into decisions
in value-added markets operating with quality constraints. For instance, processors
of petroleum, corn, and additives expand until marginal processing costs equal the
processing margin between product revenues and raw material input costs. Also,
wholesalers buy refinery gasolines and additives and sell blended gasoline; they
price gasoline at a marginal cost that includes the value of another unit of blended
gasoline plus an adjustment for the value of a constrained quality unit. For instance,
the wholesale price of blended gasoline equals the ethanol price less the subsidy
equivalent of the blender credit less a correction for ethanol’s contribution to
the octane level in a market with one quality constraint (Gallagher et al., 2001,
p. 15). Finally, supply-utilization identities are included for quality attributes. For
instance, the number of octane-bbls supplied across refinery gasolines and additives
equals the number of octane-bbls demanded across gasoline grades. In this fashion,
the shadow values for constraints jointly reflect values in processing and from
resource supplies.
The welfare function used for simulation of the US gasoline/additives sector
includes detailed costs from supply curves and benefits from demand curves.3 In
particular, demand curves for each of the 32 grades of blended gasoline are included
in benefit calculations, because consumers require different gasoline grades and
environmental specifications according to the performance characteristics of their
automobile.
Also, the three main resources and processing complexes shown in Fig. 1 are
included in cost calculations. Processing marginal cost excludes the cost of raw
2 Programming models of value added markets have been studied (Cox & Chavas, 2000;
Takayama & Judge, 1971). But analyses that include quality regulation are typically focused on the
firm level (Ladd & Martin, 1976; Wilson & Prezler, 1992).
3 Details of the simulation model are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2
Refinery and additive processing cost summary
Basis
(feed or output)
Unit Variable cost Unit capital Total
Distillation Feed $/bbl 0.353 0.292 0.645
Hydrocracker Feed $/bbl 1.625 3.454 5.079
Coker Feed $/bbl 0.599 1.399 1.998
Catalytic cracker Feed $/bbl 0.682 0.804 1.486
Reformer Feed $/bbl 6.506 0.592 7.099
Isomer Feed $/bbl 0.818 1.039 1.857
MTBEI Output $/bbl 10.586 1.954 12.540
MTBEY Output $/bbl 11.690 7.020 18.711
Alkylate Output $/bbl 4.775 1.331 6.107
Iso-octane Output $/bbl 5.615 1.655 7.270
Polymer Output $/bbl 1.347 1.331 2.678
Ethanol Feed $/bu 1.100 0.526 1.626
Unit capital costs for distillation
= 0.1781(Primary)+0.1976×0.2105(Vaccum) = 0.2921
material inputs. Most additive processes combine two or more chemicals to make
a third chemical, so the supply (marginal cost) function for additives processing
is stated in terms of additive output. But petroleum and corn processing breaks
the input molecule into many smaller molecules, making several outputs, so the
supply (marginal cost) for petroleum or corn processing is stated in terms of the
crude petroleum input. The fixed proportions assumption is used for all processes.
A summary of year 2000 baseline processing costs is given in Table 2. Variable
costs refer to labor, utilities, patent fees and enzymes required for processing. The
Unit capital is the annual capital cost for one unit of capacity. Meanwhile, costs
are given on an output basis in the case of the additive processes. The total costs
per unit help to determine the long-run competitiveness of processes in subsequent
simulations.
The factor supply curves are likely upward sloping. First, chemical inputs for
additives rely on limited volume of byproducts of natural gas production or re-
fineries and supplementary imports. Similarly, ethanol production is large enough
to bid corn away from feed use and the export market. Finally, refinery in the US
may be large on the North American Market.
Two important fiscal policies in the gasoline sector are included in the welfare
function used for the simulation study: the federal excise tax on gasoline and the
rebate for ethanol blends. Net extractions from the fuel sector, consisting of the
gas tax rate times the blended fuel quantity demanded less the retail rebate for
ethanol blends times the quantity of ethanol blends demanded, are subtracted from
net welfare. While the excise tax and ethanol subsidy are taken into account, their
removal is not considered in this study. Some economists believe that removal of
the ethanol subsidy would improve the efficiency of the grain sector. But renewal
of the subsidy still receives political support, perhaps due to the need for domestic
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energy supplies and parallel incentives in the petroleum industry (National Energy
Policy Development Group, 2001, p.6).
The constraints of the US gasoline/additives sector model reflect standards and
air quality regulations for various markets. For conventional gasoline, octane and
vapor constraints are included. For oxygenated gasoline, a minimum 2.7% oxygen
constraint is included. For reformulated gasoline, maximums were included for the
air quality constraints on VOX, NOX, and TOX. In effect, quality is endogenous
for the main fuel quality parameters influencing air quality (vapor, aromatics,
olefins, e200, e300). But explicit constraints for benzene minimum and oxygen
maximum are also included in accordance with the current federal law. The octane
constraint is also included in reformulated gasoline. Finally, exhaust emissions
functions caused convergence problems in preliminary simulations because they
are non-linear functions of the fuel quality parameters; Taylor’s series approximate
the emissions functions.
Static simulations are useful in determining the adjustments that will occur in
the time period when processors adjust their capacity to desired levels in response
to price signals from product markets, factor markets and government regulations.
Thus, the estimates give capacity levels and outputs that are economically sustain-
able by consumer demand and factor markets.4
4. Elasticity estimates and assumptions about market response
Estimates of supply curves for each factor and processing activity, and demand
curves for each product are also required for the simulations. Table 3 contains a
summary of the elasticities that are used in the simulation model. These estimates
are a combination of estimates from the literature, our own estimations, and a few
judgments. The position and slope of a supply and demand curve was set using the
given elasticity and observed price–quantity pair for the year 2000 baseline year.
The gasoline demand elasticity is a long-run estimate that is based on the liter-
ature and our own estimations, which are available from the authors.5 Some other
4 Dynamically adjusting price expectations and capacity are critical to analyses of public inventory
policies. However, dynamic models all come to the same long-run equilibrium, some faster than others.
Static models are useful in policy analyses because they indicate the viability of industries, the welfare of
consumers and the profits to resources in response to sustained policy changes. Further, the adjustment
costs associated with new market regulations are avoided when early announcements of policy changes
provide producers with sufficient time to adjust. For instance, one study focused on the short run, when
the means of importing and transporting additives are fixed; they concluded that California gasoline
prices could double in the event of an MTBE ban in California (California Energy Commission Staff,
2002). Another study demonstrated that the local handling system in California could be modified for
other additives within 6 months with a transport cost to California of $.15/gal (Renewable Fuels Assn,
1999). Finally, the overall lead time for ethanol production capacity may be about 2 years; capacity
can apparently increase about 75% over a 2-year period in response to a demand increase (MacDonald,
Yowell, & McCormack, 2001).
5 Details are available upon request.
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Table 3
Elasticity summary
Product Factor excess supply of input
to processing sector
Processing
supply
Product
demand
Petroleum 2.0 10.0
Refining byproducts/additive inputs
Normal butane 2.5
Isobutane 2.5
Butylene 2.5
Propylene 2.5
Corn 12.0 1.5
Corn refining byproducts
Gluten feed −31.5
Gluten meal −63.9
Corn oil −5.2
Additives
MTBEI 1.0
MTBEY 1.0
Iso-octane 1.0
Alkylates 1.0
Polymer 1.0
Normal butane 10.0
Gasoline −0.8
estimates of the gasoline demand elasticity are smaller when they assume that
technology (miles/gallon) is given. Similarly, most estimates do not include the
feedback from gasoline prices to GDP, and reduced gas consumption due to falling
incomes. When both of these effects are included, the demand elasticity is about 0.8.
An increase in ethanol production causes an increase in the demand for corn
and an increase in the supply of corn byproducts. Hence, estimates of demand elas-
ticities for corn byproducts are provided for estimates of changes in the byproduct
revenues of corn processors. Also, a corn supply elasticity estimates the increase
in corn refiners’ costs and the farm income increase.
For the corn refining byproducts, the elasticity estimates were adjusted after
some preliminary simulations. The estimates here assume that the byproduct mar-
kets are nearly saturated; gluten feed prices drop to energy equivalence in livestock
feed and then compete directly in the corn market; gluten meal prices drop to pro-
tein equivalence and then compete directly in the soymeal market; and corn oil
prices drop and compete directly in the soy oil market. The elasticities are large
because the corn, soymeal and soy oil markets are considerably larger than the cor-
responding corn byproducts markets. Corn and soy product elasticities are given
in Gallagher (1998).
The corn supply facing the processing industry is an excess supply, defined as the
difference between production and demand at a given price. The demand estimates
596 P.W. Gallagher et al. / Journal of Policy Modeling 25 (2003) 585–608
include both domestic feed demand and export response to a price change from the
author’s own estimations; the elasticity of total demand used is 0.33, somewhat
smaller than most large models of the ag sector. The domestic production elasticity
is 0.6, reflecting acreage and yield response to a price change. The corn supply
elasticity for the processing industry of 12.0 is large despite inelastic domestic
corn market structure for all the reasons that trade elasticities can be large when
domestic elasticities are small.
The elasticity of petroleum supplied to the US processors uses the US petroleum
supply estimate of Walls (2003). Also, an ologipoly pricing model discusses OPEC
and American fringe area countries’ (Canada and South America) adjustments to
a petroleum price change (Gallagher & Johnson, 1999). An elasticity of about 2
is obtained when OPEC adjustment to demand changes, US domestic adjustment,
and fringe adjustments in Canada, and South America are all included in the excess
supply curve to US processors.
Some estimations of chemical input supply functions were calculated. The im-
plied supply elasticity to the additives processors was 2.5 for butane and statistically
significant. Elasticity estimates for the other chemicals, isobutane, butylene and
propylene, were smaller, about 0.5. But the t-values were marginal here. Since
large price adjustments occurred in preliminary simulations, the butane elastic-
ity estimate was used for these chemical markets; perhaps some elasticities we
underestimated due to multicolinearity. Larger elasticities may occur due to the
processing connections to large markets, such that natural gas to butylene, and LP
gas to isobutane (Donaldson & Culberson, 1983).
Estimates of processing elasticities are sparse. Corn products processing re-
sponse has an elasticity of 0.5 when capacity is a given explanatory variable; but
the additive processing elasticity may be larger during the period of capacity adjust-
ment, reflecting location, labor and regulation advantages. So processing supply is
assumed at 1.5 for corn and 1.0 for other additives. For petroleum, a constant cost
processing is assumed (elasticity10) due to excess capacity. For butane, no costs
are needed for additive use.
A preliminary analysis of gasoline demand by grade showed that each grade
of gasoline has distinct and technologically separated demands because a statisti-
cal analysis of relative prices and market shares did not suggest any substitution
between grades of gasoline.6 Hence, distinct demand curves were specified for
each grade, each EPA formulation, and each region with distinct vapor regulation.
Each demand curve depends only on the own price. The overall gasoline elasticity
market is used for all local markets.
Quality arbitrage is also included in the model. An arbitrage activity can permit
downward grade substitution if high quality inputs are cheap enough. For instance,
midgrade gasoline could be used to fill regular gasoline demand in the conven-
tional gasoline market of the north in the winter. However, substitution across
6 Details are available on request.
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formulations, locations and seasons was not included. Together the assumptions
of technologically separate demand and arbitrage across grades generated a system
of premium and discounts that are consistent with the observed system of price
premiums and discounts (Table 5).
5. Simulation
Assessments of growth potential for additives with simulation models are useful,
because the outcome will likely depend several offsetting factors, such as the cost
and qualities of fuel components, and the details of regulations on clean fuels.
The existing policies are a useful starting point, because the 1990 Clean Air Act
just became effective in 2000. It will take more time to fully adjust to these new
regulations.
5.1. Baseline: implications of existing policies in a growing market
The implications of existing policies was estimated with a two-step procedure.
First, the simulation model was calibrated using year 2000 data to identify the
position of demand and supply curves at observed prices in factor and product
markets. Second, the condition of overall gasoline demand and world petroleum
price came from “reference” simulations for the world energy market (Energy
Information Administration, 2002); the demand intercept for each gasoline grade
was increased by about 20% to achieve an overall 4.0 bil. barrel gasoline market
for the year 2015; the intercept of the petroleum supply curve was adjusted to
$24.5/bbl. The estimated price and quantity changes in the input and additive
market simulations refer to real changes in prices because the simulation was
aligned to real petroleum and gasoline price estimates from the world energy
baseline.
Further, the initial corn excess supply curve does not shift from the initial
position in the year 2000 level. In effect, we assume that no exogenous changes
are shifting the corn supply or demand. Sans changes in agricultural policy, the real
corn price estimate would likely have upward bias, because yield increases and real
price declines have been occurring on a steady 50-year trend. Put another way, the
offsetting effects of another decade of increasing corn yields and the elimination
of all corn subsidies would in fact give a corn excess supply curve that is stable.
5.2. Modeling impending policy changes
Two alternative policies are compared to the baseline. Under one version, a
national MTBE ban is added to the 2015 baseline with the existing EPA law
(including a 2.0% oxygen standard) in place. The MTBE ban is included in the
simulation model by adding a restriction that the consumption of this additive is
zero in all forms of gasoline demand. In the second option, the oxygen standard
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is replaced with a renewable fuel averaging policy. With renewable averaging,
blenders must sell a given amount of ethanol in all of their gasoline sales (s. 1766,
sec. 818). The renewable averaging policy is included in the simulation model
by removing the oxygen constraint in reformulated fuel, and adding a restriction
requiring that the sum of ethanol used in gasoline consumption across all grades
must equal 5 bil. gallons (0.119 bil. barrels). The assumption of a national MTBE
is retained in the simulation of a renewables standard.
6. Results
The results of the simulations are summarized in Tables 4 through 8. Table 4
contains the main market prices and quantities in processing, factors and product
markets. Table 5 contain the details of gasoline demand and prices by grade. Table 6
shows ethanol utilization by market under various circumstances. Table 7 provide
summaries of the welfare measures associated with the policy options. Table 8
provides a summary of the implications for the EPA’s target pollutants. Detailed
tables that give endogenous estimates of fuel quality attributes are available from
the authors. Recipe tables for all 32 formulations of gasoline are also available.
6.1. Effects in markets
Most refinery gasoline and additive prices are somewhat lower in the 2015
baseline than they were in the year 2000, likely because the baseline petroleum
price is lower in the future. The overall energy market outlook also suggests a 33%
increase in the consumption of gasoline. Our simulations confirm a shift towards
the additives industry. In particular, there is a 0.54 bil. bbl expansion of refinery
gasoline production and a 0.31 bil. bbl expansion in additives. The ethanol price
increases, owing to the stable corn supply function and expanding demand. Hence,
ethanol shares in the expansion of the additives industry.
The premium/discount structure among grades of refinery gasoline and addi-
tives in the 2015 baseline reflects the value of attributes possessed by the various
gasoline components. At the top of the premium structure, ethanol is about $20/bbl
above MTBE; this premium is about $2/bbl less than the subsidy differential for
ethanol, suggesting that the composite octane, vapor, and oxygen comparison be-
tween the two gives MTBE a slight quality advantage. At the bottom of the price
schedule, coker gasoline, butane, and catalytic cracker gasoline have low octane
content, high vapor pressure and high benzene content, respectively. Also, a com-
parison of the actual 2000 data with the 2015 baseline shows that the average
price of refinery gasoline declines while the prices of additives remains stable or
increase. So the demand shift favors additives.
To understand the changes estimated for the long-run effects of a national MTBE
ban, one must first look closely at the gasoline demand by grade and retail prices
in Table 5. Specifically, there is a fairly large reduction in the quantity and an in-
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Table 4
Gasoline and additive products: prices and quantities
Variable (units) Actual 2000 baseline 2015 Baseline National ban Renewable std.
Corn processing Quantity (bil. bu) 0.6150 1.6480 1.6870 1.8650
Price ($/bu) 1.7320 2.1020 2.1140 2.1690
Margin ($/bu) 1.6400 4.3680 4.4590 4.8720
Corn products, price Gluten feed ($/ton) 65.7600 70.6570 70.9860 72.4780
Gluten meal ($/ton) 277.3500 270.0520 269.7760 268.5210
Corn oil ($/lb) 0.1170 0.0790 0.0780 0.0710
Ethanol ($/bbl) 66.3600 86.3270 87.9460 95.2950
Corn byproducts, output Gluten feed (bil. ton) 0.0042 0.0111 0.0110 0.0130
Gluten meal (bil. ton) 0.0008 0.0022 0.0020 0.0020
Corn oil (bil. lb) 0.9540 2.5547 2.6150 2.8910
Ethanol (bil. bbl) 0.0393 0.1050 0.1080 0.1190
Petroleum processing Quantity (bil. bbl) 5.5840 6.7440 6.3680 6.4590
Price ($/bbl) 28.2300 24.5430 23.8710 24.0340
Margin ($/bbl) 3.1750 3.1630 3.1460 3.1510
Refinery gasoline, wholesale price Distillation 44.8830 43.7920 44.2000
Hydrocracker 44.7120 43.5590 43.9590
Catalytic cracker 47.8470 47.1840 47.3700
Coker 43.2330 42.0100 42.5270
Reformate 51.2020 50.8040 50.7640
Isomerate 44.3020 43.0430 43.5460
Reformer, no benzene 52.1040 51.5400 51.5900
Average retail price 53.1100 48.3990 47.8420 47.7110
Refinery gasoline, quantity Distillation 0.2400 0.2900 0.2740 0.2780
Hydrocracker 0.0410 0.0490 0.0470 0.0470
Catalytic cracker 1.5410 1.8620 1.7580 1.7830
Coker 0.0900 0.1090 0.1030 0.1040
Reformate 0.3550 0.4280 0.4050 0.4100
Isomerate 0.1370 0.1660 0.1560 0.1590
Reformer, no benzene 0.2280 0.2740 0.2590 0.2630
Sum 2.6320 3.1780 3.0020 3.0440
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Table 4 (Continued )
Variable (units) Actual 2000 baseline 2015 Baseline National ban Renewable std.
Byproducts, price ($/bbl) Normal butane 21.0200 43.2680 38.7110 41.2400
Isobutane 64.4800 52.8130 59.1780 59.2610
Butylene 54.0800 32.4480 32.4480 32.4480
Propylene 36.8800 33.3700 38.0070 38.084
Natural gas plant supply (bil.) Normal butane 0.0584 0.2130 0.1810 0.0550
Isobutane 0.0690 0.0380 0.0550 0.0000
Butylene 0.0192 0.0000 0.0000 0.0560
Propylene 0.0515 0.0390 0.0550 0.5600
Additive, price ($/bbl) Butane 21.0200 43.2680 38.7110 41.2400
MTBE (isobutylene) 63.6730 60.0420 46.9280 46.9940
MTBE (butylene) 73.2240 66.3850 32.7080 32.7080
Iso-octane 62.2710 55.5230 54.8390 55.1020
Alkylates 76.3950 54.8790 61.6100 61.6280
Polymers 64.8500 52.2750 57.3090 57.5260
Additive, output (bil. bbl) Butane 0.1449 0.3270 0.2920 0.3120
MTBE (isobutylene) 0.0389 0.0560 0.0000 0.0000
MTBE (butylene) 0.0383 0.0690 0.0000 0.0000
Iso-octane 0.0100 0.0140 0.0060 0.0060
Alkylates 0.2237 0.2160 0.3030 0.3080
Polymers 0.0500 0.0670 0.0740 0.0760
Ethanol (bil. bbl) 0.0393 0.1050 0.1080 0.1190
Sum 0.5451 0.8540 0.7830 0.8210
Gasoline Quantity (bil. bbl) 3.0740 4.0980 3.8260 3.9
Price ($/bbl) 61.9108 63.6434 66.0774 62.8982
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crease in the price of reformulated gasoline in the summer, reflecting the increased
cost of making summer reformulated fuel without MTBE. In preliminary simula-
tions, refiners and blenders no longer provided these categories of gasoline, which
suggests some non-linearities in gasoline demand. In view of existing problems
in the simulation model that are likely associated with non-linear restrictions, we
assumed a maximum reduction in gasoline demand of 25%, to avoid over adjust-
ment; large adjustment in urban areas is plausible, as people adjust to more fuel
efficient cars and use mass transport. In contrast, the retail gasoline price falls in
conventional areas and consumption increases in response.
In Table 4, overall gasoline consumption falls. Thus, the factor markets also in-
dicate reduced prices and quantities. Specifically, outputs of both refinery gasoline
and most additives declines relative to the baseline. Ethanol output and price in-
crease slightly, because there are no other sources of oxygen for reformulated fuel.
When the renewables standard replaces the oxygen standard, some of the large
price increases in reformulated fuel are reversed (Table 5). Hence, total gasoline
consumption increases slightly from the oxygen standard case in Table 4, and
the average retail gasoline price is reduced from the oxygen standard case. Both
additives and refinery gasoline outputs are higher with renewable averaging. How-
ever, ethanol output and price are about 10% higher with renewable averaging,
compared to the oxygen standard.
Table 5
Variable units Actual 2000 Baseline 2015 National ban Renewable std.
Quantity consumed (bil. bbl)
(a) Gasoline demand, by grade, season, EPA classification
RGC 0.5324 0.6740 0.6830 0.6800
MGC 0.0636 0.0840 0.0850 0.0850
PRC 0.0965 0.1300 0.1320 0.1310
RGR 0.2636 0.3510 0.3540 0.3530
MGR 0.0399 0.0550 0.0550 0.0550
PRR 0.0630 0.0880 0.0000 0.0000
RGO 0.0263 0.0370 0.0370 0.0370
MGO 0.0039 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PRO 0.0040 0.0060 0.0000 0.0060
RGCS 0.3602 0.4770 0.4810 0.4800
MGCS 0.0405 0.0550 0.0560 0.0550
PRCS 0.0606 0.0840 0.0840 0.0840
RGRS 0.1675 0.2290 0.1670 0.2300
MGRS 0.0250 0.0350 0.0250 0.0000
PRRS 0.0389 0.0550 0.0390 0.0000
RGOS 0.0052 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070
MGOS 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
PROS 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
RGCN 0.3836 0.5040 0.5100 0.5080
MGCN 0.0362 0.0490 0.0490 0.0490
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Table 5 (Continued )
Variable units Actual 2000 Baseline 2015 National ban Renewable std.
Quantity consumed (bil. bbl)
PRCN 0.0468 0.0640 0.0650 0.0650
RGRN 0.1949 0.2600 0.2620 0.2610
MGRN 0.0270 0.0370 0.0370 0.0370
PRRN 0.0422 0.0590 0.0590 0.0590
RGON 0.0374 0.0530 0.0000 0.0530
MGON 0.0054 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050
PRON 0.0024 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000
RGCSN 0.2560 0.3470 0.3490 0.3490
MGCSN 0.0230 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320
PRCSN 0.0311 0.0440 0.0440 0.0440
RGRSN 0.1243 0.1730 0.1240 0.1740
MGRSN 0.0166 0.0240 0.0170 0.0000
PRRSN 0.0255 0.0370 0.0250 0.0370
RGOSN 0.0240 0.0330 0.0330 0.0330
MGOSN 0.0033 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050
PROSN 0.0015 0.0020 0.0020 0.0000
Sum 3.0741 4.1000 3.8250 3.9160
Retail price ($/bbl)
(b) Gasoline retail price, by grade season EPA classification
RGC 56.421 62.997 61.889 62.315
MGC 60.878 63.830 62.727 63.194
PRC 64.119 64.951 63.864 64.314
RGR 61.058 63.282 62.428 62.604
MGR 65.239 64.354 63.494 63.684
PRR 68.536 65.376 0.000 0.000
RGO 68.740 63.924 63.146 63.269
MGO 71.311 0.000 0.000 0.000
PRO 72.817 66.461 0.000 65.954
RGCS 60.584 63.374 62.482 62.737
MGCS 64.198 64.229 63.328 63.613
PRCS 67.307 65.385 64.460 64.754
RGRS 63.727 63.241 92.404 62.549
MGRS 68.727 64.315 99.654 0.000
PRRS 70.766 65.335 102.611 0.000
RGOS 64.050 64.117 63.182 63.523
MGOS 67.490 65.214 64.273 64.622
PROS 70.208 66.444 65.517 65.867
RGCN 59.503 62.958 61.796 62.236
MGCN 62.372 63.884 62.777 63.169
PRCN 66.015 65.040 63.933 64.304
RGRN 61.102 63.271 62.390 62.580
MGRN 65.077 64.344 63.489 63.677
PRRN 67.838 65.367 64.534 64.718
RGON 68.170 63.873 0.000 63.139
MGON 70.214 101.810 101.810 101.810
PRON 71.673 66.541 0.000 0.000
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Table 5 (Continued )
Variable units Actual 2000 Baseline 2015 National ban Renewable std.
Quantity consumed (bil. bbl)
RGCSN 63.091 63.421 62.850 62.821
MGCSN 66.034 64.357 63.568 63.845
PRCSN 69.490 65.525 64.700 64.980
RGRSN 65.713 63.255 95.284 62.557
MGRSN 69.613 64.348 100.939 0.000
PRRSN 72.191 65.348 104.677 64.689
RGOSN 66.365 64.292 63.536 63.736
MGOSN 69.224 65.438 64.573 64.891
PROSN 71.241 66.629 65.811 0.000
Gas type UWXYZ. UW = RG: regular, MG: migrade, PR: premium; X = C: conventional, R:
reformulated, O: oxygenated; Y = blank for winter, S: for spring; Z = blank for South, N: for north.
Table 6
Ethanol utilization, by fuel type policy
Fuel type Actual 2000
(in bil. bbl)
Baseline 2015
(in bil. bbl)
Ban with oxygen
std. (in bil. bbl)
Ban with averaging
(in bil. bbl)
Conventional 0.0291 0.075 0.039 0.115
Reformulated 0.0096 0.025 0.065 0.000
Oxygenated 0.0006 0.004 0.004 0.004
Total 0.0393 0.104 0.108 −0.119
The changing pattern of ethanol consumption is summarized in Table 6. About
3/4 of ethanol is used in the conventional gasoline market under the baseline. With
the ban and the oxygen standard, the dominant market is reformulated fuel. With
the RFS, ethanol use shifts back to conventional fuel.
The RFS involves the largest corn demand expansion and price increase because
the ethanol output increase is largest. The 1,250 mil. bu expansion of corn demand
is substantial, amounting to 12% of year 2000 corn production. The estimates
suggest an increase in the real corn price of $.35/bu, which would restore the real
corn price at levels of the mid 1990s.
6.2. Surplus measures
Table 7 contains a comparison of welfare measures. Moving from the baseline
to the ban suggests reductions in consumer surplus, profits and tax collections,
which are partly offset by increased marketing margins. There is a net welfare loss
of about $60 per person annually. The renewable averaging provision with the ban
allows consumers and profits to recover some of the welfare loss associated with the
ban and the oxygen standard but the marketing margin declines. Further, the high
net welfare suggests an efficiency gain with RFS of about $2 per person annually.
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Table 7
Surplus measures
Fuel type Actual
2000
Baseline 2015
w/EPA reg/
oxy std.
Ban with
oxygen std.
Ban with
averaging
Consumer surplus (bil. $) 118.966 212.809 191.721 202.755
Gasoline 118.95 212.695 191.602 202.609
Reformulated 41.159 76.606 56.685 65.09
Conventional 74.368 129.829 132.385 131.409
Oxygenated 3.424 6.261 2.532 6.111
Corn byproducts 0.016 0.114 0.119 0.146
Profits 25.134 37.927 34.826 37.113
Petroleum
Producers 43.75 40.606 36.204 37.246
Processors 4.263 2.864 6.448 6.498
Additives
Producers −25.1 −12.868 −14.939 −15.065
Input chemicals 1.723 3.751 3.367 3.857
Corn
Producers 0.059 0.421 0.441 0.539
Processors 0.439 3.153 3.305 4.038
Net marketing margin 5.859 63.316 69.434 56.576
Retail gasoline revenues 190.32 260.85 252.873 246.335
Wholesale expenditures 184.461 197.534 183.439 189.759
Additives 29.282 38.27 34.497 36.579
Refinery gasoline 158.36 152.565 141.91 144.531
Ethanol 1.713 9.086 9.476 11.35
(Less)subsidies −4.894 −2.387 −2.444 −2.701
Extraction from sector: excise tax 48.502 64.663 60.313 61.778
Net sector surplus 189.462 249.391 235.668 234.668
Total welfare 237.964 314.054 295.981 296.446
6.3. Emissions implications
EPA standards that restrict the rate per mile traveled effectively constrain emis-
sions per gallon of gasoline used with given auto technology (fuel economy and
emission control technology). Accordingly, the total emissions estimate (Table 8)
equals the constrained emission rate per mile multiplied by fuel economy and to-
tal gasoline consumption. Total emissions can still increase with higher gasoline
consumption, even when EPA constraints are satisfied.
In the baseline solution, the VOC constraint binds in all reformulated sum-
mer fuel. Also there is a binding vapor constraint in conventional gas. However,
TOX was not constraining, and NOX constrained the solution only in winter re-
formulated fuel. In comparing the emissions for 2000 and the 2015 baseline, VOC
emissions increase about 20%, reflecting the increase in total gasoline consump-
tion with a slightly lower emission rate. The toxic emissions actually decreased
from 2000 to 2015; the rate of toxic emissions was generally not constraining for
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Table 8
Emissions
Fuel type Actual
2000
Baseline 2015
w/EPA reg/
oxy std.
Ban with
oxygen std.
Ban with
averaging
Volitile organic compounds
Reformulated area (mil. met. ton) 0.905 1.130 0.936 0.970
Conventional area (mil. met. ton) 3.975 4.088 3.981 4.156
Toxics
Reformulated area (mil. met. ton) 0.051 0.047 0.040 0.043
Conventional area (mil. met. ton) 0.145 0.094 0.091 0.093
Nitrous oxide
Reformulated area (mil. met. ton) 1.159 1.469 1.225 1.267
Conventional area (mil. Met. ton) 2.626 2.892 2.853 2.905
either solution. Finally NOX emissions increase between now and 2015. Imposi-
tion of an MTBE ban seems to reduce all categories of pollutants in all types of
gasoline, perhaps due to the reduction in the quantity of gasoline consumed.
7. Summary and conclusions
Ethanol competes on the basis of quality and cost in the gasoline additives
markets. The potential for demand expansion resides in clean air regulations, health
restrictions aimed at safe drinking water, and the notion that renewable fuels may
help stem energy supply and global warming problems. Some likely developments
in markets and revisions in policies are investigated, using a simulation model that
accounts for the effect of changing prices on the demand for gasoline; competition
in additives markets and processing; and developments in the factor markets for
petroleum, corn and chemicals.
The first scenario assumes that the year 2000 EPA clean air regulations are
in place (complex model including oxygen standard), the most likely petroleum
market conditions occur and expansions in gasoline demand over the next 15 years
are plausible. The demand expansion favors additives. Additives expand relatively
more (56%) than refinery gasoline output (20%), even though petroleum becomes
more competitive. Also, the ethanol industry could double from its present size by
2015. The ethanol demand growth occurs partly in reformulated fuel for oxygen
content, but the demand expansion for conventional fuel is larger.
In the second scenario, the MTBE ban extends nationally. This causes increasing
gasoline prices and welfare losses for consumers of reformulated gasoline that are
only partly offset by reduced gasoline prices and welfare gains for consumers
of conventional gasoline; the net welfare loss for the US gasoline and additives
sector is on the magnitude of $60 per person annually. Interestingly, the long-run
expansion in ethanol demand associated with a national MTBE ban is moderate
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compared to the 2015 baseline, on the order of 3.5%; when ethanol replaces MTBE
in the reformulated fuel market, falling chemical input prices make other additives,
such as alkylates, more competitive in the conventional fuel market. Hence, the
long-run welfare gains for corn producers and processors associated with a national
ban are also slight.
In the third scenario, a renewable fuel requirement for 5.0 bil. gallons (0.119
bbl) was considered in conjunction with a national ban. Then the overall welfare
loss associated with the MTBE ban declines; efficiency is improved some; ethanol
demand reorients towards the conventional octane market without the oxygen
restriction and reformulated gasoline is produced using alkylates. Thus, summer
reformulated gasoline prices return to the baseline levels.
Overall there is a net reduction in market-based welfare when the renewable
fuel standard or the national ban are implemented. But the economic cost may be
more than offset by environmental improvement; emissions of the EPA’s clean air
criteria pollutants all improve with the renewable standard or the ban; removal of
MTBE may reduce cancer risk; and expanding ethanol production likely improves
global warming. The policy judgment must weigh the market costs against more
intangible environmental benefits.
In any event, the simulations suggest that ethanol will be a source of improving
profits for corn producers and processors under all three policy scenarios. Ac-
cording to these estimates, gasoline additives will continue to have a growing role
in gasoline supplies, and ethanol participates in this expansion. The largest corn
demand expansion is associated with the 5.0 bil. Gallon mandated ethanol mar-
ket, which would restore real corn prices to mid-1990s levels. A previous study
concluded that competition for the land and corn resource should limit the ethanol
industry to the present size (Meekhof, Tyner, & Holland, 1980). But the economic
environment has changed to a stagnant export market with growing productivity;
therein lies the potential for expanding biofuels.
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